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TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
JAMES G. STARKEY*
It has long been settled that a defendant in a criminal case
who deliberately absents himself after his trial has begun waives
his right to be present and may be tried in absentia.' Almost as
long standing is the widespread notion that there is some sort of
talismanic significance to the commencement of trial and that,
unless the trial has in fact begun when the defendant wanders,
there is no legal authority for trial in absentia.2 The fact is that
there is no such impediment, and the practice of trying in absentia
those who take flight prior to the commencement of trial seems to
be growing.'
The subject of this article is the state of the law in this area
today, the origins of that law and the myths surrounding it, the
rationale by which the constitutional right to be present is deemed
waived by voluntary absence and the effect of such waiver upon
other rights.
HISTORY OF TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
The right of an accused to be present at his trial is traceable to
* Acting Justice, New York Supreme Court, Second Judicial District. B.A., St. Mi-
chael's College, 1954; LL.B. 1957, J.D. 1968, St. John's University.
I See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); Falk v. United States, 15 App.
D.C. 446 (1899), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618 (1901). Of course there is no requirement that the
trial be continued. The court also has the power to declare a mistrial. See Cureton v. United
States, 396 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966).
2 See, e.g., [1943] Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
relative to the preliminary draft of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which
later became Rule 43. The notes on Rule 38 state: "The second sentence [of the rule] permits
continuance of trials both in felony cases if the crime is not punishable by death and in
misdemeanor cases when the defendant by his voluntary act absents himself after the com-
mencement of the trial. Under this provision the defendant is required to be present at
arraignment and plea and the trial must be begun in his presence." Id., quoted in Cureton
v. United States, 396 F.2d 671, 673 (1968) (quoting 1943 Notes of the Advisory Committee
Relating to the Preliminary draft of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). The
Notes of the Advisory Committee to a 1946 edition of the Rules includes the following state-
ment: "The second sentence of the rule is a restatement of existing law. . . ." Notes of the
Advisory Committee Relating to the Preliminary Draft of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, S. Doc. No. 175, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1946). See also Commonwealth
v. Felton, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 398, 307 A.2d 51 (1973); notes 27-29 and accompanying text
infra.
See, e.g., Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351 (1973); United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d
167 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d
1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); Arizona v. Hunt, 408 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 845 (1969); People v. Hicks, 90 Misc. 2d 609, 395 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup.
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the earliest days of Anglo-Saxon law. From the outset, it appears
.that no tribunal would enter judgment on a complaint unless the
accused was present.' One reason for this rule was the means em-
ployed to determine the merits. Among the most common of the
early methods used in England was trial by ordeal and, plainly, only
a defendant who was available could be tested against hot iron or
boiling water.5 After the Norman Conquest in 1066 another method
was developed, but the new one-trial by battle-also required the
defendant's presence as one of the combatants.' Through the efforts
of the clergy, trial by ordeal was finally abolished around 1219, but
trial by battle remained a standard means of determining the merits
for many years afterward.'
An accused who unjustifiably absented himself was not tried
in absentia or formally adjudged guilty by default, instead, he was
declared an "outlaw".' While it has been suggested that this distinc-
tion is evidence of an innate aversion to default judgments in crimi-
nal cases and, therefore, of a relatively healthy sense of justice,'
upon scrutiny the difference seems more apparent than real. First,
it appears that, at the outset, outlawry was in fact considered pun-
ishment for a crime."0 Moreover, the consequences of conviction
upon an accused could hardly have been more severe than those of
Ct. N.Y. County 1977), aff'd mem., 68 App. Div. 2d 1019, 417 N.Y.S.2d 152 (lst Dep't 1979);
State v. La Belle, 18 Wash. App. 380, 568 P.2d 808 (1977).
4 11 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 105 (4th ed. 1936); Goldin, Presence
of the Defendant in Rendition of the Verdict in Felony Cases, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 18, 18 (1916).
Under the Salic law, violations such as mayhem, robbery and homicide were not perceived
as offenses against the community, but as private wrongs against the victim. See J. AMEs,
LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 39 (1913); I J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 60 (1883). See generally People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 348, 334 N.E.2d 566, 570,
372 N.Y.S.2d 606, 622, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1975). If an injured party succeeded in an
action against the wrongdoer, the latter was required merely to compensate his victim. See
J. AmES, supra, at 39; H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 217-18 (2d ed. New York 1954) (1st ed. London
1861). "If the party injured proceeded against the wrongdoer, the latter, in most cases,
escaped with the payment of pecuniary compensation and a fine. . .. One could tell to a
shilling just what it would cost to kill one's neighbor's cow, or even the neighbor himself." J.
AmsS, supra, at 39. In many respects this was the mark of a society whose institutions were
incapable of maintaining order, acceding to the more efficient retribution of the individual
victim. See II F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 449 (2d ed. 1923);
Phelps, Procedural Aspects of Early Common Law, 7 MANITOBA L.J. 111 (1976).
1 IV W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342-43 (15th ed. London
1809). See also id. at 345.
See II F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 600; J. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at
61.
H1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 599.
M W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAw 604-05 (5th ed. 1942).
See People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 348, 334 N.E.2d 566, 570, 372 N.Y.S.2d 606, 611,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1975); Goldin, supra note 4, at 20.
11 See I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 450.
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outlawry, which included forfeiture of all property and, at least until
about 1329, being subject to summary execution by anyone who
came upon him." Thus, it seems more accurate to say that the
impact of outlawry was "in effect, a conviction,' 2 and that judg-
ments in absentia were not entered because the same purpose was
accomplished by outlawry. 3
Later, when trial by jury replaced trial by battle and trial by
ordeal, the rule was retained, and the presence of the defendant was
still required. Absence of a defendant deprived the court of jurisdic-
tion preventing a trial from commencing, or, if already begun, from
continuing." For these reasons and because until relatively recently,
an accused was required to defend himself without the assistance
of counsel,'5 the right to be present was imbedded in the common
law and well recognized when the sixth amendment was drafted.'6
" See III W. HoLDswORTH, supra note 8, at 605; T. PLucKNarT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 430-31 (5th ed. 1956). The severe consequences of "outlawry" have been
graphically described as follows:
[Society] could not measure its blows; he who defied it was outside its sphere; he
was outlaw. He who breaks the law has gone to war with the community; the
community goes to war with him. It is the right and duty of every man to pursue
him, to ravage his land, to bum his house, to hunt him down like a wild beast and
slay him; for a wild beast he is; not merely is he a 'friendless man,' he is a wolf.
11 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 449.
, T. PLUCKNE T, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 431 (5th ed. 1956).
"See III W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 8, at 605. As Holdsworth states:
We have seen that English law has always refused to try a man in his absence. The
survival of this primitive rule is probably due to the fact that in cases of treason or
felony such a power was hardly necessary for the law has always had the power to
punish him in his absence by forfeiture, and to treat him as condemned if he could
be captured.
"See II F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 4, at 594-95.
" See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); State v. Adams, 20 Kan. 311, 326
(1878); State v. Outs, 30 La. Ann. 1155, 1156-57 (1878); L. OanFLD, CRMINAL PROCEDURE
FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 350 (1947); J. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 424.
11 See generally Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934), overruled on other
grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); State v. Outs, 30 La. Ann. 1155, 1156 (1878).
The right to be present is protected by constitutional or statutory provisions, or both, in
virtually every jurisdiction in the United States. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; FED. R.
CRIM. P. 43; ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALA. CODE 15, § 15-2-20(c) (1975); ALASKA CONST.
art. I, § 11; ALASKA CRIM. R. 38; ARZ. CONsT. art. 2, § 24; ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 9.2, 14.2, 15.3(d),
19.2, 26.9; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 865, 977, 1018, 1043, 1148, 1193 (West
1970 & Supp. 1979); CONN. CONsT. art. 1, § 8; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-92 (Supp. 1979); DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 7; DEL. SUPER. CT. CRjI. R. 43; DEL. CT. C.P. CRIM. R. 43; DEL. CT. J.P. CRIM.
R. 25; FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 16; FLA. R. CHns. P. 3.180, 3.190(j)3; GA. CONST.
art. I, § 2-111; ILL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 113-1, 115-3, -4(h), -4.1, -8
(Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1979); MD. CONsT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 21; MD. R. PROC.
723, 724, 740(f); MASS. CONST pt. 1, art. XII; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 6 (West 1972);
MAss. R CRIM. P. 18 (1979); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 20; MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 763.1, 768.3
(1970); N.H. CONST. pt. First, art. 15th; N.J. CONsT. art. 1, 10; N.J. R. Gov'G CRIM. PRAC.
19791
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Further, when the charge was a felony, the defendant's presence was
deemed a requisite to jurisdiction, and the right was considered
absolute and nonwaivable.' 7
Over the years, however, an exception was engrafted onto the
rule. While upholding the principle that the defendant's presense
was jurisidictional in capital cases and where the defendant was in
custody, various state and federal courts held that a defendant in a
non-capital case who was not in custody could waive the right to be
present by voluntarily absenting himself after the trial had begun.1 8
The proposition was well established by the turn of the century, but
was not ruled on by the Supreme Court until its landmark decision
in Diaz v. United States.'" In that case, the defendant, charged with
homicide as a non-capital offense and free on bail, voluntarily ab-
sented himself from the trial during the testimony of two witnesses,
and expressly consented that the trial proceed in the presence of his
attorney. 0 On appeal after the conviction, the defendant urged that
his presence could not be waived and therefore the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to proceed in his absence. The Court, while observing
3:16; N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 14; N.M. R. Cram. P. 47 (1974); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.Y.
Calm. PRoc. LAW §§ 170.10, 180.10, 210.10, 260.20, 310.30, 310.40, 340.50, 380.40 (McKinney
1971 & Supp. 1979); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23; OoO CONST. art. I, § 10; Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2938.12, 2945.12, .16 (Page 1975); OHIo R. CraM. P. 5, 10, 43; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9;
PA. R. CraM. P. 1112, 1117, 1120(b) (1968); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 10th; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 6501 (1974); VT. R. CriM. P. 43; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; VA. CODE §§ 19.2-237, -257, -258,
-259 (1975); Wis. CONST. art. I, § 7; Wis. STAT. § 971.04 (1975); Wyo. CONST. art. I; Wyo. R.
CRIM. P. 42.
," See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892); Ball v. United States, 140
U.S. 118, 129-31 (1891); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884); Maurer v. People, 43 N.Y.
1, 4 (1870); Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 608-09, 115 S.E. 679, 681 (1923); Cohen,
Trial in Absentia Reexamined, 40 TENN. L. REv. 155, 168 & n.84 (1973); Flaum & Thompson,
The Case of the Disruptive Defendant: Illinois v. Allen, 61 J. CaM. L.C. & P.S. 327, 328
(1970).
Historically, the commencement of trial in absentia in a misdemeanor case stands on a
totally different footing, and the practice of trial in absentia for misdemeanors, at least those
punishable solely be fine, was quite common. See, e.g., Henderson v. Town of Murfreesboro,
119 Ark. 603, 607, 178 S.W. 912, 914 (1915); Lebanon & Big Spring Turnpike Co. v. State,
141 Tenn. 675, 675, 214 S.W. 819, 819 (1919). But see, e.g., In re Speiser, 150 Cal. App. 2d
561, 566 n.4, 310 P.2d 454, 460 n.4 (1957); Davenport v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 327, 330
(Ky. 1963); Ellis v. State, 267 S.C. 257, 260-62, 227 S.E.2d 304, 305-06 (1976). It is also
significant to note that until 1836 an Englishman charged with a felony was denied the aid
of counsel-a right fully accorded to one charged with a misdemeanor-such that the necess-
ity of the latter's presence was considerably diminished. See IV W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
5, at 355.
" See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 139 Cal. 527, 528, 73 P. 416, 417 (1903); Robson v. State,
83 Ga. 166, 167, 9 S.E. 610, 611 (1889); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 163 Mass. 458, 459, 40
N.E. 766, 767 (1895); Fight v. State, 7 Ohio 181, 183 (1835); Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 697, 700
(1864).
19 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
20 Id. at 444.
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that the right to be present extends to every stage of the trial and
is "scarcely less important to the accused than the right of trial
itself,"'" nevertheless concluded:
[W]here the offense is not capital and the accused is not in cus-
tody, the prevailing rule has been,'that if, after the trial has begun
in his presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify
what has been done or prevent the completion of trial, but, on the
contrary, operates as a waiver of his right to be present and leaves
the court free to proceed with the trial in like manner and with like
effect as if he were present. 2
Further, although the Diaz case did not involve a defendant
who had become a fugitive, the court quoted extensively and with
approval from Falk v. United States,2s a case which did. In the Falk
case, the defendant, who had been released on bail, was present at
the commencement of his trial but later absconded. Following his
conviction, the defendant was apprehended and sentence was im-
posed despite his objection that the trial had continued in his ab-
sence.2 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.
Basing its determination on policy grounds, the court reasoned that
"it does not seem. . . consonant with the dictates of common sense
that an accused person, being at large upon bail, should be at lib-
erty, whenever he pleases, to withdraw himself from the courts of
his country and to break up a trial already commenced."" To hold
21 Id. at 455.
" Id. Neither the capital case nor the custody limitations seem to have any viability
today. In 1975, Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was amended to permit
the continuation of trial in absentia in capital cases. See ADvisoaY CommrrrE NoTE To FED.
R. CRIM. P. 43, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 271, 326-27; 8B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcuIcE 43.01[1]
(1979). It is also well settled that a waiver by a defendant in custody is now permissible. See,
e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Pearson v. United States, 325 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir.
1963); People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 334 N.E.2d 566, 372 N.Y.S.2d 606, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 999 (1975).
23 15 App. D.C. 446 (D.C. 1899), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618 (1901).
24 Id. at 450-51.
2 Id. at 454. The court also noted that:
[t]he practical result of such a proposition, if allowed to be law, would be to
prevent any trial whatever until the accused person himself should be pleased to
permit it. For by the statute . . . he is entitled as a matter of right to be enlarged
upon bail "in all criminal cases where the offense is not punishable by death"; and,
therefore, in all such cases he may by absconding prevent a trial. This would be a
travesty of justice which could not be tolerated; and it is not required or justified
by any regard for the right of personal liberty. On the contrary, the inevitable result
would be to abridge the right of personal liberty by abridging or restricting the right
now granted by the statute to be abroad on bail until the verdict is rendered. ...
. . . The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused person,
placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the safeguards with which the
1979]
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otherwise, the court noted, would be to allow a defendant to defy
with impunity the processes of the criminal law by which his free-
dom is protected. 6
While discussing the applicable law in factual contexts involv-
ing voluntary absence of a defendant after trial had commenced,
both the Diaz and Falk cases seemed to imply that trial in absentia
was lawful in that context only. In large measure, if not exclusively,
it was the language of these cases that gave birth to the notion that
a defendant who took flight before the trial commenced could not
be tried in absentia.2 The confusion was subsequently compounded
by various legal draftsmen who injected the same erroneous impli-
cation into rules and statutes meant to codify the case law. s Thus,
while the law of trial in absentia expanded in other ways after the
Diaz decision,' 9 many years passed before it was seriously suggested
that a felony trial could be commenced in the absence of the defen-
dant. It appears that the first entity to do so was the American Law
Institute in 1930 in its Model Code of Criminal Procedure.'" Eight
humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity
defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and
turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its own safety,
to restrict the operation of the principal of personal liberty. Neither in criminal nor
in civil cases will the law allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong. And
yet this would be precisely what it would do if it permitted an escape from prison,
or an absconding from the jurisdiction while at large on bail, during the pendency
of a trial before a jury, to operate as a shield.
Id. at 454-55, 460-61.
28 Id. at 460.
21 See United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 183-84 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1088 (1976); Government of Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Felton, 224 Pa. Super, 398, 307 A.2d 51 (1973).
28 See, e.g., FED. R. Cium. P. 43 (1974)(amended 1975). Prior to amendment, Rule 43
provided:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every state of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the
imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecutions
for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the
trial has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to
and including the return of the verdict.
Id. See also note 2 supra.
See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (right of presence may be lost
by misconduct)(dicta); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (waiver of defendant's pres-
ence at verdict in capital case upheld).
3 ALI MODEL CODE CrIM. PROC. § 287 (1930). Section 287 provides:
Presence of defendant under prosecution for felony. In a prosecution for a felony
the defendant shall be present: -
(a) At arraignment.
(b) When a plea of guilty is made.
(c) At the calling, examination, challenging, impanelling and
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years later, the Arizona legislature adopted the Institute's provision
intact,3' and the practice of commencing trials in absentia has been
thriving there ever since. 2 For reasons which remain obscure, the
constitutionality of the Arizona legislation was apparently not chal-
lenged for almost 30 years. When it was, the statute was promtly
declared unconstitutional by a United States district court,33 but
the decision was reversed and the legislation upheld on appeal .
3
Soon thereafter the United States Court of Appeals for the
swearing of the jury.
(d) At all proceedings before the court when the jury is present.
(e) When evidence is addressed to the court out of the presence of
the jury for the purpose of laying the foundation for the introduction of
evidence before the jury.
(f) At a view by the jury.
(g) At the rendition of the verdict.
If the defendant is voluntarily absent, the proceedings mentioned above except
those in clauses (a) and (b) may be had in his absence if the court so orders.
Id.
*1 ARiz. CODE ANN. § 44-1401 (1939); see State v. Ransom, 62 Ariz. 1, 162 P.2d 621 (1944).
Section 44-1401 was subsequently superseded and substantially duplicated by ARiz. CraM. P.
231 (1956), which in turn was superseded by the current provision, Amiz. CRiM. P. 9.1 (1973).
Section 9.1 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in these rules, a defendant may waive his right to be
present at any proceeding by voluntarily absenting himself from it. The court may
infer that an absence is voluntary if the defendant had personal notice of the time
of the proceeding, his right to be present at it, and a warning that the proceeding
would go forward in his absence should he fail to appear.
While some writers have suggested that other states have adopted similiar legislation,
see 10 NATIONAL CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM LAWS, UNIFORM L. ANN., RULES OF CRIM. P.,
315-16 (1974) (Comment Rule 713) (referring to Pennsylvania, Texas); Cohen, supra note 17,
at 160 (referring to Louisiana), scrutiny of the relevant authorities does not support this
proposition. See Commonwealth v. Felton, 224 Pa. Super. 398, 307 A.2d 51 (1973) (commence-
ment of felony trial in absentia held reversible error); Commonwealth v. Estep, 84 York 93,
50 Pa. D. & C.2d 200 (1970) (misdemeanor trial commenced in absentia; ambiguity of Rule
1117 of Pa. R. of Crim. P. discussed); LA. CODE CPlM. PRO. ANN. art. 832 (West 1967) (provid-
ing only that "temporary;' voluntary absence is not objectionable); TEx. CODE CRiI. P. art.
33.03, 36.01 (1966) (providing that "when the defendant voluntarily absents himself after
pleading to the indictment. . .the trial may proceed to its conclusion." Art. 36.01, however,
provides for pleading after jury selection.). See also Gonzalez v. State, 515 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.
Ct. Crim. App. 1974). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has also
concluded that Arizona stands alone. See United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
32 See, e.g., Arizona v. Hunt, 408 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 845 (1969);
State v. Bohn, 116 Ariz. 500, 570 P.2d 187 (1977); State v. Davis, 108 Ariz. 335, 498 P.2d 202
(1972); State v. Tacon, 107 Ariz. 353, 488 P.2d 973 (1971), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 351 (1973);
State v. Cook, 118 Ariz. App. 154, 575 P.2d 353 (1978); State v. Rice, 116 Ariz. App. 182, 568
P.2d 1080 (1977).
-" In re Hunt, 276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967), vacated sub nom. Arizona v. Hunt,
408 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 845 (1969).
' Arizona v. Hunt, 408 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 845 (1969). See also
State v. Goldsmith, 112 Ariz. 399, 400, 542 P.2d 1098, 1099 (1976) (an banc).
1979]
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Second Circuit, in United States v. Tortora, 3 became the first court
in the country-in a case not originating in Arizona-to uphold a
felony conviction after trial in absentia of a defendant who fled
before the commencement of trial. 6 In that case, one of five defen-
dants voluntarily failed to appear in court on the day designated for
the commencement of trial." The trial, which had been previously
postponed because of conflicting schedules of defense attorneys and
the absence of other defendants, was begun and the absent defen-
dant was convicted.3 On appeal, the defendant relied upon the
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 9 and the clear impli-
cation of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that
trial could not be commenced in a defendant's absence.'
The court of appeals, while acknowledging that only courts
construing Arizona law had found a waiver of the right to be present
when the defendant had taken flight prior to trial, held that there
was no constitutional barrier to trial in absentia in such a case and
that Rule 43 was similarly no impediment, relying on the Advisory
Committee's note that "the rule is a restatement of existing law."4'
The court emphasized, however, that it must be clear that defen-
dant was advised when proceedings were to commence and volun-
tarily, knowingly and unjustifiably failed to appear. Further, the
- 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santoro v. United States, 409 U.S. 1063
(1972).
11 Two years earlier, the same court had blazed a similar trail by upholding a ruling that
a defendant had waived his right to be present at a pretrial suppression hearing by failing to
apply for permission to enter the country for that purpose. See United States v. Dalli, 424
F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970). More recently, the court applied the
guidelines set forth in the Tortora case and affirmed another conviction in a case where trial
was commenced (and the jury selected) in absentia. See United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d
930 (2d Cir. 1977).
3, 464 F.2d at i209.
u Id. at 1207.
'5 Id. at 1208. The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides, in part, that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The fourteenth amendment makes the
confrontation clause binding upon the states. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
10 See notes 2 & 28 supra. At almost the same time, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit agreed with that interpretation of Rule 43. See Campbell v. United
States, 295 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Then, on rehearing after the Tortora case was decided,
the court deferred to the Second Circuit, but adhered to its decision on the ground that the
lower court, by commencing trial in absentia, had either abused its discretion or failed to
exercise it at all. Id.
11 See United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1210 n.6. See also note 2 supra. It should be
noted that, while Rule 43 authorizes trial in absentia, there is no corresponding right of a
defendant to absent himself if he chooses-especially when identification is a prime issue.
See United States v. Moore, 466 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1111 (1973);
United States v. Fitzpatrick, 437 F.2d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 1970).
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court determined that commencing trial in the absence of a defen-
dant is discretionary and only to be done "in circumstances as ex-
traordinary as those before us. Indeed, we would add that this dis-"
cretion should be exercised only when the public interest clearly
outweighs that of the voluntarily absent defendant."4" The court
noted that the factors to be considered in deciding whether to pro-
ceed included: (1) the likelihood that the trial could soon take place
with the defendant present; (2) the difficulty in rescheduling, par-
ticularly in multiple defendant trials; and (3) the burden on the
prosecution in having to undertake two trials, again particularly in
multiple defendant trials where the evidence against the defendants
is often overlapping and more than one trial might keep the prosecu-
tion's witnesses in substantial jeopardy. 3 In a footnote, the court
narrowed the standards still further by noting: "It is difficult for us
to conceive of any case where the exercise of this discretion would
be appropriate other than a multiple-defendant case.""
Shortly after the Tortora case, the United States Supreme
Court impliedly upheld the constitutionality of commencing trial in
the absence of a defendant who voluntarily fails to appear on the
designated date and, further, indicated that the narrow limits sug-
gested by the Second Circuit in the Tortora case exceed constitu-
tional requirements. In Tacon v. Arizona,5 the defendant, while
serving in the army was arrested and charged with the sale of mari-
juana in Arizona. Prior to trial he was discharged from the army and
voluntarily left Arizona for New York. He did not return for his trial
and was tried and convicted in absentia. Shortly afterward, he
returned to Arizona and claimed that he had not appeared for trial
because he had been unable to raise travel funds. H e was held to
have waived his right to be present and received a sentence of 5 to
5 years.47 The conviction was affirmed by the Arizona Supreme
Court 8 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 9
The court then dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, stating
that the question upon which certiorari had been granted involved
"constitutional limits of the States' authority to try in absentia a
1z United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1210.
43 Id.
" Id. at n.7.
'5 107 Ariz. 353, 488 P.2d 973 (1971), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 351 (1973).
Id. at 354, 488 P.2d at 974.
'7 Id. at 356-57, 488 P.2d at 976-77.
41S Id. at 358, 488 P.2d at 978.
41 407 U.S. 909 (1972).
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person who has voluntarily left the State and is unable, for financial
reasons, to return to that State"5 and that that question had not
been raised below. Significantly, however, the court went on to note
that:
The only related issue actually raised below was whether peti-
tioner's conduct amounted to a knowing and intelligent waiver of
his right to be present at trial. . . . [T]his is primarily a factual
issue which does not, by itself, justify the exercise of our certiorari
jurisdiction .... 51
Since the Tacon case, the courts of appeals for the third and
fourth circuits have also affirmed convictions after trials begun in
absentia. In the third circuit case, Government of the Virgin Islands
v. Brown," the defendant was served with a subpoena directing him
to appear for commencement of.trial. He failed to appear at the
designated time and voir dire was commenced over his attorney's
objection."3 The defendant appeared in the afternoon, offered no
explanation for his absence, and the trial was continued. He was
convicted and urged on appeal that it had been error to commence
the trial in his absence. In affirming, the court of appeals observed
that it did not perceive any magical properties which differentiate
the commencement of a trial from later stages. "It would be anoma-
lous," the court states, "to hold that a defendant cannot waive his
right to be present during the period of often routine voir dire ques-
tioning but can waive that right during the time when witnesses
against him are presenting crucial evidence." 4
The court cited the Tortora case as authority and, like the court
in the Tortora case, held that Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure was merely a restatement of the common law and no
barrier to commencement of trial in absentia. Unlike the court in
50 410 U.S. 351, 352 (1973).
" Id. In a stinging dissent, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
charged the majority with holding that "the broad issue of whether a defendant charged with
a felony can ever waive his right to be present at trial is not properly before us." Id. at 353
(Douglas, J., dissenting). The language of the majority, however, appears to disprove that
statement. It seems clear that the majority assumed an affirmative answer to that question
and merely declined to determine whether the evidence in this case justified that conclusion.
See id. at 352. Further, it seems worthy of note that examination of the briefs submitted to
the Supreme Court suggests that the evidence against the defendants on that issue was
considerably stronger than that set forth in the dissent. See also State v. Tacon, 107 Ariz.
353, 488 P.2d 973 (1971), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 351 (1973).
52 507 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1975).
13 Id. at 187.
1, Id. at 189.
[Vol. 53:721
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
the Tortora case, however, the third circuit did not view the fact
that the trial involved only one defendant as controlling or, indeed,
even worthy of discussion.5
In United States v. Peterson," one of several defendants volun-
tarily failed to appear in court on the date designated for trial and
became a fugitive. He was tried and convicted in absentia; then
apprehended and sentenced several months after the trial." On ap-
peal, the court rejected the contention that Rule 43 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure restricts trial in absentia to defendants
who are present at the commencement of trial. Like the courts in
the Tortora and Brown cases, the court held that Rule 43 was merely
a restatement of the common law and did not preclude the com-
mencement of trial in absentia in an appropriate case." The court
also noted:
[There are] two reasons for the general common law right of pres-
ence in federal trials: (1) assuring, a nondisruptive defendant the
opportunity to observe all stages of the trial not involving purely
legal matters so as to prevent the loss of confidence in courts as
instruments of justice; and (2) guaranteeing the defendant the
opportunity to aid in his defense so as to protect the integrity and
reliability of the trial mechanism. So long as the defendant has
been provided with the opportunity to be present, neither purpose
is thwarted by a defendant's voluntary exercise of his option not
to attend.
Since 1975, courts in at least two states besides Arizona have
also permitted commencement of trial in absentia." In one case"
53 Id.
56 524 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976).
Id. at 183.
Id. at 183-84. A set of extraordinary circumstances similar to those in the Tortara case
- including multiple defendants - existed in this case and the court referred with approval
to the restrictive language found in the Tortora case. Id. at 185-86.
11 Id. at 184. See also United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1258-59 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1024 (1974).
60 People v. Thomas, 97 Misc. 2d 845, 412 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1978);
People v. Hicks, 90 Misc. 2d 609, 395 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977), aff'd mem.,
68 App. Div. 2d 1019, 417 N.Y.S.2d i52 (1st Dep't 1979); State v. LaBelle, 18 Wash. App.
380, 568 P.2d 808 (1977). In the LaBelle case, the defendant was charged with burglary.
Although he was notified of the date and time his trial would begin, the defendant failed to
appear and became a fugitive. He was tried and convicted in absentia, then apprehended
and sentenced 4 years later. On appeal, the Washington appellate court affirmed, citing both
the Tortora and the Peterson cases. Id. at 390, 392, 568 P.2d at 814, 815. The court did not
discuss and was apparently untroubled by the suggestion in those cases that commencement
of trial in absentia should occur in extraordinary circumstances only.
11 People v. Hicks, 90 Misc. 2d 609, 395 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977), aff'd
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where trial proceeded in absentia, the court expressed doubts that
it was necessary for the prosecution to demonstrate a compelling
necessity to proceed pursuant to the teaching of the Tortora case,
but held that such a necessity existed because there was more than
one defendant and some witnesses were both intimidated and mo-
bile.12 In a second state case where an absent defendant was tried,6 3
the court acknowledged that multiple defendants were not involved
and that there was no question of requiring the prosecution to un-
dertake two trials, but noted that the charge (murder) was serious,
that the only eyewitness lived outside the jurisdiction, and that
there was no likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the
defendant present. 4 Relying on the Tortora case, the court stated
that two out of three criteria prescribed there was satisfied and,
finding that sufficient, proceeded to trial in absentia.6 5
The notion that trial may be commenced in absentia has also
gained respectability in other quarters. Several years ago, for
example, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended that
commencement of trial in absentia be authorized as to a defendant
who voluntarily fails to appear for trial.6 Rule 713 of the Uniform
Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted by The National Conference
mem., 68 App. Div.2d 1019, 417 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dep't 1979). In the Hicks case two
defendants were charged with robbery. During a pretrial hearing, a witness gave damaging
evidence against one defendant, Phillip Bermudez, who never returned from a recess declared
when the witness left the stand. Id. at 610, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 578. The trial court held that the
defendant had waived his right to be present and concluded the hearing in absentia, after
which a jury was selected and the defendant Bermudez was tried and convicted in absentia
as well.
62 90 Misc. 2d at 611-12, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 579. In addition, the court noted that the case
had been moved for trial prior to the commencement of the hearing and, employing what
would appear to be a legal fiction, ruled that the trial was in progress when the defendant
became a fugitive. Id. at 617-18, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
People v. Thomas, 97 Misc. 2d 845, 412 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1978).
In the Thomas case the defendant's trial had been repeatedly postponed because the prosecu-
tion had been unable to locate the only eyewitness who had left the jurisdiction. On Novem-
ber 29, 1978, both sides answered ready, but the case was adjourned for 2 days because of
involvement of the defense attorney in another trial. The defendant failed to appear on the
adjourned date and after a hearing at which the People demonstrated their attempts to locate
the defendant, the People moved the case to trial. Id. at 846, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
6, Id. at 849, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 754-55.
65 Id.
6 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS (Apr. 1971 & Jan. 1973),
reprinted in 21 A.L.R. FED. at 910. The Committee recommended that Rule 43 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure be amended, to provide for commencement of trial in absentia,
as follows:
(b) Continued Presence Not Required.
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of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August, 1974, contains
a similar provision."
NATURE OF WAIVER
The early cases gave little consideration to the nature of the
waiver imputed to a defendant who voluntarily absented himself
from his trial. When the defendant absented himself temporarily
and consented that the trial proceed in his absence, there was, of
course, an express waiver. 8 When, on the other hand, the defendant
became a fugitive after the commencement of trial, most of the
cases seemed to rule that he had lost the right to be present as a
matter of policy.69 More recently, however, the United States Su-
preme Court has often discussed the law of waiver and prescribed
strict standards which must be met before a waiver of constitutional
rights will be found-at least as to those rights which guarantee a
fair trial and protect the reliability of the truth-finding process.70 It
The progress of a trial to and including the return of a verdict shall not be prevented
and the defendant shall be considered to have waived his right to be present when-
ever:
(3) a defendant, who has personally entered a plea to the charge and has been
personally advised when the trial is to commence, voluntarily, knowingly, and
without justification, fails to be present at the designated time and place for trial.
Id. This proposal was not adopted in the 1974 amendments.
" 10 UNIFORM RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (U.L.A.) Rule 713. Rule 713 provides in
pertinent part:
(b) Required presence. The defendant must be present at every stage of the trial
and at the disposition hearing, but if he will be represented by counsel at the trial
or hearing, the court may:
(2) Direct that the trial or part thereof or disposition hearing be conducted in his
absence if the court determines that he understandingly and voluntarily failed to
be present after personally having been informed by the court of:
(i) His right to be present at the trial or hearing;
(ii) When the trial or hearing would commence; and
(iii) The authority of the court to direct that the trial or hearing be conducted
in his absence.
See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 460 (1899), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618 (1901);
United States v. Loughery, 26 F. Cas. 998, 1000 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1876); Gore v. State, 52 Ark.
285, 287, 12 S.W. 564, 565 (1889), appeal dismissed, 180 U.S. 636 (1901); Sahlinger v. People,
102 Ill. 241 (1882); State v. Perkins, 40 La. Ann. 210, 212, 3 So. 647, 648 (1888); Common-
wealth v. McCarthy, 163 Mass. 458, 460, 40 N.E. 766, 767 (1895); State v. Gorman, 113 Minn.
401, 129 N.W. 589 (1911); Price v. State, 36 Miss. 531, 542-43 (1858); State v. Hope, 100 Mo.
347, 13 S.W. 490 (1890); State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 2 S.E. 185 (1887).
70 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-37 (1973); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938).
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is well settled, for example, that the courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of such rights. 71 It is further settled
that a waiver of such a right must be "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege. 72 All of this means,
as the Court has stated: "Waivers of constitutional rights not only
must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely conse-
quences." 73
The application of these standards relative to waiver of the
right to be present has, of course, presented little difficulty when the
defendant was actually present in court or, at least, in custody. In
such cases the court has invariably been in a position to be sure that
the defenaant was aware of his rights and the consequences of a
waiver.74 But as to the defendant who has become a fugitive before
and even during the trial, reconciling the applicable standards with
a holding that the defendant has waived the right to be present has
frequently proved troublesome. For example, a number of courts
have been concerned by a proposition not even deemed worthy of
notice in most of the early cases,75 which is that the average defen-
dant, unless expressly so advised, would not be aware that the con-
sequences of his departure would include trial in absentia.76
The argument was unsuccessfully urged upon the Supreme
Court in Taylor v. United States. 7 n that case the defendant be-
came a fugitive after the commencement of his trial. The trial was
11 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). But cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (upholding a consent search). In that case, the Court noted: "[U]nlike
those constitutional guarantees that protect a defendant at trial, it cannot be said every
reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment [of fourth
amendment rights]." Id. at 243.
72 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
7 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). See also Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S.
351, 355 (1973)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
1, See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935 (9th
Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 944 (1975); Pearson v. United States, 325 F.2d
625 (D.C. Cir. 1963); People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343, 334 N.E.2d 566, 372 N.Y.S.2d 606, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1975). But see United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(trial court did not sufficiently assure a knowing and intelligent waiver before proceeding in
absentia).
'5 See note 69 supra.
7, See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 441 F.2d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States
v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Tacon, 107 Ariz. 353, 355, 488
P.2d 973, 975 (1971), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 351 (1973). See also People v. Burts, 64 App.
Div. 2d 283, 286, 409 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864 (4th Dep't 1978).
77 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
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continued and he was convicted in absentia. On appeal, he urged
that mere voluntary absence from the trial could not be an effective
waiver "unless it [was] demonstrated that he knew or had been
expressly warned by the trial court, not only that he had a right to
be present, but also that the trial would continue in his absence and
thereby effectively foreclose his right to testify and to confront per-
sonally the witnesses against him." '78
The Court rejected the argument that it must be demonstrated
that the defendant knew these things,79 but ruled, in the same
breath, that it was self-evident that he had such knowledge:
It is wholly incredible to suggest that petitioner . . . enter-
tained any doubts about his right to be present at every stage of
his trial. It seems equally incredible to us, as it did to the Court of
Appeals, "that a defendant who flees from a courtroom in the
midst of a trial-where judge, jury, witnesses and lawyers are pres-
ent and ready to continue-would not know that as a consequence
the trial could continue in his absence." Here the Court of Appeals
noted that when petitioner was questioned at sentencing regarding
his flight, he never contended that he was unaware that a conse-
quence of his flight would be a continuation of the trial without
him. 0
Thus, in the Taylor case, the Court seems to have steered a
middle course between charging a waiver to the defendant as a
matter of policy and strict adherence to the standards previously
prescribed for waiver of fundamental rights. While paying formal
obedience to the proposition that knowledge of the consequences
is required for an effective waiver, the court simply postulated that
the defendant had the requisite knowledge.81
7' Id. at 19.
7' Id. at 20. Further in a footnote, the Court made the following observation:
This [erroneous view] was substantially the holding of United States v.
McPherson, on which petitioner relies. But the Court of Appeals in the case now
before us disagreed with McPherson, and, in our view, rightly so. McPherson itself
appears to have strayed from recent precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit,
Cureton v. United States, as well as from older authority. In Cureton, supra Judge
Fahy stated the controlling rule:
"[If a defendant at liberty remains away during his trial the court may
proceed provided it is clearly established that his absence is voluntary. He must
be aware of the processes taking place, of his right and of his obligation to be
present, and he must have no sound reason for remaining away."
Id. at 19 n.3 (citations omitted).
'o Id. at 20. See also State v. Davis, 108 Ariz. 335, 337,498 P.2d 202, 204 (1972) (en banc).
SI That such a defendant would know his trial will continue in absentia is not, it is
suggested, as clear to everyone as it was to the Supreme Court. It seems at least conceivable,
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Where the defendant has taken flight prior to trial, of course,
that position is less easy to defend.8" It is not surprising then, that
the courts which have countenanced the commencement of trial in
absentia have generally been more inclined to discuss the exigencies
than whether the defendant knew the trial would start without
him." An exception is the line of cases decided pursuant to statutory
authority in Arizona which requires warning that the proceeding
will go forward in absentia if the defendant fails to appear.8 4 Inter-
estingly, full compliance has apparently been accomplished in that
state by including the warning in the release order which every
defendant receives and signs after he posts bond or is paroled. 5
therefore, that the compelling policy considerations for continuing trial in absentia in such
circumstances contributed to the result.
At least one lower court had evinced puzzlement at the decision. See State v. Staples,
354 A.2d 771 (Me. 1976). There, while noting that a waiver of the right to be present must
meet the standards laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst, the court interpreted the Taylor case to
mean that it was not necessary for the accused to know that the trial would continue in his
absence. Understandably, the court experienced some difficulty in reconciling the two notions
as indicated by the following language: "Although the Court's reasoning in Taylor is not fully
explained, the opinion points out, significantly, that the right at issue is the right to be
present. We understand the Court to be distinguishing between One's right to be present at
trial and the right to absent oneself from trial." 354 A.2d at 776.
2 Since the notion that trial may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock most
lawyers, it would hardly seem appropriate to impute knowledge that this will occur to their
clients.
See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1088 (1976); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santoro
v. United States, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); People v. Hicks, 90 Misc. 2d 609, 395 N.Y.S.2d 577
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977), aff'd mem., 68 App. Div. 2d 1019, 417 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dep't
1979); State v. LaBelle, 18 Wash. App. 380, 586 P.2d 808 (1977). Nor has the United States
Supreme Court come to grips with the question. To date, the Court has consistently declined
to review any conviction stemming from a trial commenced in absentia.
"' See note 31 supra. But see State v. Sanchez, 116 Ariz. 118, 568 P.2d 425 (1977). In
that case the defendant, tried and convicted in absentia, argued that he had not had personal
notice of the trial date as required by Rule 9.1. Id. at 121, 568 P.2d at 427. The court noted
that the defendant had effectively prevented his attorney from notifying him of the date and
held that this constituted a waiver of notice or justified the inference of voluntary absence.
Id.
85 The release order that a defendant must sign prior to his release on bail provides in
pertinent part:
WARNING TO THE DEFENDANT:
YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT YOUR TRIAL AND AT A NUMBER OF OTHER PROCEEDINGS
OF WHICH YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED. IF YOU DO NOT APPEAR AT THE TIME SET BY THE COURT,
A WARRANT WILL BE ISSUED FOR YOUR ARREST and the proceeding will begin without
you.
17 Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. Form VI, at 724 (1973)(emphasis in original); see State v.
Tacon, 107 Ariz. 353, 355, 488 P.2d 973, 975 (1971), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 351 (1973); ARiz.
R. CRIM. P. 9.1, 17 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN., Comment at 120-21 (1973).
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
EFFECT OF WAIVER BY VOLUNTARY ABSENCE ON OTHER RIGHTS
The defendant, who, by voluntary absence, waives his right to
be present may be affected in several significant ways. One involves
the admissability during trial of evidence of flight. The principle
that evidence of flight is admissible to show consciousness of guilt
has plain application when a fugitive is tried in absentia,"5 but the
subject has been somewhat obscured by ambiguous practices and
language. Since evidence of a post-arrest bail jump87 or attempted
escape" from jail is admissible against a defendant who is present
at trial, there is clearly no basis for exempting the more successful
fugitive who is tried in absentia." The cases suggest some disagree-
ment, however, about the extent of the evidence that must be ad-
duced before the prosecution is entitled to a charge concerning
flight. For example, in State v. Camino,8" it has been held that while
failure to appear for trial is sufficient to infer voluntary absence and
to proceed to trial in absentia, it is "insufficient to support an infer-
ence of the element of concealment or attempted concealment
which is essential to warrant the giving of a flight instruction unless
11 See, e.g., United States v. DeLeon, 498 F.2d 1327, 1331 (7th Cir. 1974); State v.
Carmino, 118 Ariz. 89, 574 P.2d 1308 (1977); People v. Vargas, 53 Cal. App. 3d 516, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1975). But see State v. Staples, 354 A.2d 771 (Me. 1976) (where Maine's highest
court approved the practice of merely informing the jury that the defendant had made a
choice not to be present and, in cases where they became aware of defendant's conduct,
instructed them to give no weight to the act of flight). See also State v. Shetsky, 229 Minn.
566, 572-73, 40 N.W.2d 337, 341 (1949) (evidence of flight stated to be admissible, but convic-
tion reversed because of prejudicial comments by trial judge).
11 See Hanks v. United States, 388 F.2d 171, 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 863
(1968); Rowan v. United States, 277 F. 777 (7th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 600 (1922).
" See People v. Yazum, 13 N.Y.2d 302, 196 N.E.2d 263, 246 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1963). Here,
the court held evidence of the attempted escape admissible, rejecting the interesting argu-
ment that the conduct was ambiguous since there were charges pending in Ohio as well as in
New York. See also State v. Roderick, 9 Ariz. App. 19, 448 P.2d 891 (1968).
11 See State v. Andrial, 150 N.J. Super. 198, 201-02, 375 A.2d 292, 294 (1977). Notwith-
standing the logic of this proposition, it is the writer's experience that, in the trial courts of
New York, counsel for an absconding defendant requests and - possibly through an excess
of caution - usually receives an instruction to the jury that they should not draw any adverse
inferences from, or even speculate about, the defendant's absence. For example, the trial
judge in People v. Thomas, 97 Misc. 2d 845, 412 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1978),
a murder trial commenced in absentia, has advised that he gave such an instruction in that
case and that, incidentally, the trial ended in an acquittal despite a strong prosecution case.
It should be further noted that apparently the New York courts do not stand alone in this
regard. As noted in Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 18 (1973), the trial judge repeatedly
gave a similar instruction in that case. See also United States v. DeLeon, 498 F.2d 1327, 1331
(7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Garcia-Turino, 458 F.2d 1345, 1346 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 951 (1972).
10 118 Ariz. App. 89, 574 P.2d 1308 (1978).
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the flight or attempted flight is open, as upon immediate pursuit."9'
At least two other courts have taken a less stringent position,
however, and upheld convictions in cases where the jury had been
charged concerning flight, even though all of the testimony tending
to show voluntary absence had been received outside their pres-
ence. " Each court also held it permissible for the trial judge to make
statements to the jury tending to suggest that the absence was vol-
untary. 3
Further, in People v. Snyder,94 it was held that the court had
properly given a flight charge when the jury had observed the defen-
dant's absence but been given no further information whatsoever on
the subject. The court ruled that: "It was proper for the trial court
to instruct the jury [concerning flight] since in the absence of any
explanation it would be reasonable to infer that defendant's absence
was voluntary .... ,,15
Some courts also have taken the position that where the defen-
dant has in fact been a fugitive, he will not be heard to complain
that there was insufficient evidence before the jury to support a
flight charge. For example, in United States v. DeLeon,6 the court
I d. at 94, 574 P.2d at 1310. The court contrasted Camino with State v. Roderick, 9
Ariz. App. 19, 448 P.2d 891 (1968), where evidence showed that a bench warrant had been
issued when the defendant failed to appear for trial and that extradition proceedings had been
commenced in the State of Washington. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Brimage, 374 N.E.2d
607 (Mass. App. 1978). In Brimage it was urged that the trial court erred in making inquiry
regarding the defendant's absence, allowing limited testimony that the police were ignorant
of the defendant's whereabouts, allowing the prosecutor to suggest an adverse inference in
his summation, and referring to a possible inference against thb defendant in its charge. The
appellate court refused to reach the merits because no exception had been taken below.
" People v. Vargas, 53 Cal. App. 3d 516, 126 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1975); State v. Andrial, 150
N.J. Super. 198, 375 A.2d 292 (1977). In the Vargas case, the testimony received out of the
presence of the jury was that the defendant was seen running through the courthouse parking
lot shortly before the trial was to begin. 53 Cal. App. 3d at 523, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 93. In the
Andrial case, testimony was admitted out of the jury's presence that the defendant and his
girlfriend had packed their belongings and had departed in the defendant's car on the evening
prior to the commencement of his trial. 150 N.J. Super. at 199, 375 A.2d at 293.
13 In the Vargas case, the trial court flatly stated that: "It appears [the defendant] has
voluntarily left." 53 Cal. App. 3d at 522 n.2, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 92 n.2. In the Andrial case,
the court advised the jury "of the facts surrounding the departure of the defendant.
150 N.J. Super. at 200, 375 A.2d at 293.
" 56 Cal. App. 3d 195, 128 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1976).
'5 Id. at 199, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
" United States v. DeLeon, 498 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir. 1974). See also People v. Vargas, 53
Cal. App. 3d 516, 126 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1975). The court in Vargas affirmed the conviction using
the following language:
In the second place, even if the instruction [concerning flight] may have been of
questionable validity on the evidence properly before the jury, the facts, as ulti-
mately established, demonstrated that the defendant's absence was occasioned by
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was relatively untroubled by a charge relative to flight which could
have been construed as applying to a defendant named Gloria Diaz,
and which would then have been based upon mere absence. During
the trial, the defendant Diaz failed to appear after lunch on the
second day. The judge told the jury that she was unable to be
present and had waived her right to be present and the trial pro-
ceeded. The court refused to tell the jury that Diaz was absent
without permission, but charged them concerning flight-a charge
coincidentally appropriate to the codefendant DeLeon who had fled
the initial arrest." The court of appeals was unsympathetic to the
argument that the charge apparently included the defendant Diaz
and was unsupported by the evidence. It was observed that the
defendant Diaz had not been alprehended for 41/2 months after the
trial and that "[e]ven if the jury understood the, flight instruction
as applying to Diaz' absence from trial, there was no prejudice since
her own counsel did not know her whereabouts, and no plausible
excuse for her absence has been offered."98
As a practical matter, meeting any resonable standard of evi-
dence that a defendant has taken flight should be relatively easy in
most cases. Judicial restraint and prudence require that an appro-
priate investigation establish that the absence is not voluntary be-
fore a trial is begun or continued in absentia," so that a mistrial
after the trial has gone forward is not caused by the arrival of a
defendant who has merely been unavoidably detained.' 9 The sub-
mission of the evidence already in hand from such a reasonably
thorough investigation,101 along with any appropriate subjects of
judicial notes,' 2 will ordinarily more than meet the need.
consciousness of guilt. This is not to say that subsequent events can cure a prior
error, but it indicates that if the premise on which the instruction was given was
invalid, the defendant would have been entitled to a new trial on other grounds.
Id. at 531, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 99. Paradoxically, a defendant who may be subject to an adverse
inference because of flight would seem at the same time still entitled to an instruction that
no adverse inferences may be drawn from his failure to testify. See id.; State v. Andrial, 150
N.J. Super. 198, 203-04, 375 A.2d 292, 295 (1977).
97 498 F.2d at 1331.
93 Id.
11 See, e.g., People v. Hicks, 90 Misc. 2d 609, 611, 395 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1977), aff'd mem., 68 App. Div. 2d 1019, 417 N.Y.S.3d 152 (1st Dep't 1979). See also
People v. Vargas, 53 Cal. App. 3d 516, 526, 126 Cal. Rptr. 88, 95 (1975).
' See also Wade v. United States, 441 F.2d 1046, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1971); State v. Cook,
115 Ariz. App. 146, 148, 564 P.2d 97, 100 (1977).
0I There is ample authority for the proposition that flight may be established by showing
unsuccessful efforts by the police to find the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Malizia,
503 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Waldman, 240 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1957);
Kanner v. United States, 34 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1929).
,02 See, e.g., State v. Camino, 118 Ariz. App. 89, 574 P.2d 1308 (1977). There the court
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Waiver by voluntary absence of the right to be present also
affects a number of other important rights. In general, the courts
have been scrupulous to protect the affected rights, consistent with
the policy considerations involved in the practice of conducting trial
in absentia.13
It has been held, for example, that while the defendant may
waive the right to be present, counsel has no authority to do so on
his client's behalf"0 and counsel for an absent defendant has no
power to waive his client's right to trial by jury.' 5 Nor may counsel,
during the inquiry concerning the reasons for defendant's absence,
properly disclose communications from his client which arose out of
the attorney-client relationship and which were clearly meant to be
confidential.0"
It also seems clear that waiver by voluntary absence acts as a
waiver of neither the right to counsel'0 nor the requirement that the
prosecution adduce evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."8 It should be noted, however, that while the right
to effective assistance of counsel abides, the New York Court of
Appeals, in People v. Aiken,"' observed that refusal of the defense
attorney, as a tactical matter, to participate in the trial will not
entitle the defendant to reversal for deprivation of the right to coun-
sel. ' 9 Further, waiver of the right to be present by a fugitive neces-
held that it was proper for the trial court to take judicial notice of its records which recorded
both notification to defendant of the trial date and his right to be present and warning that
the trial would proceed if he failed to appear. Id. at 90, 574 P.2d at 1309.
113 See notes 104-112 infra. Codefendants claiming guilt by association with a defendant
tried in absentia, of course, have a more remote claim. See United States v. Cianchetti, 317
F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir. 1963). The Cianchetti court held that the defendant who was present
was not entitled to a severance.
I", See United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908
(1969); Evans v. United States, 284 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1960); Greenberg v. United States, 280
F.2d 472 (1st Cir. 1960); Miles v. State, 222 Ind. 312, 53 N.E.2d 779 (1944). See also People
v. Anderson, 16 N.Y. 2d 282, 213 N.E.2d 445, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1965) (defendant's right to
be present at suppression hearing held not waived when court and counsel proceeded without
explanation in his absence).
' State v. Cochran, 109 Ariz. 327, 509 P.2d 220 (1973); State v. Little, 104 Ariz. 479,
455 P.2d 453 (1969).
106 See People v. Vargas, 53 Cal. App. 3d 516, 126 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1975). In that case it
was held that statements by the defendant evincing consciousness of guilt, i.e., fear that the
key prosecution witness would show up and testify against him, were privileged. By way of
contrast, a statement immediately before his depature that he was going to his car for his
coat was held not privileged. Id. at 527-28, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
117 See People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394, 380 N.E.2d 272, 408 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1978).
"' See People v. Singleton, 62 App. Div. 2d 1043, 404 N.Y.S.2d 444 (2d Dep't 1978).
' People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394, 380 N.E.2d 272, 408 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1978).
11 The court also noted that the defendant who becomes a fugitive during his trial must
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sarily includes waiver of the right to testify,"' and it has been held
that this right can even be waived by persistently disruptive con-
duct."2
Another right which may be affected by voluntary absence is
the right to be present at sentencing. A defendant convicted in a
federal court may not be sentenced in absentia."' The same rule
applies in a number of other jurisdictions,"4 but there is no constitu-
tional impediment and many states countenance sentencing in
absentia as well."15 Further, it has been held that the court may
properly take into account on sentence the fact that the defendant
took flight during his trial."6 Finally, though many fundamental
rights turn on the question of whether a defendant tried in absentia
was voluntarily absent, it seems clear that such a defendant is not
entitled to a trial by jury of that issue.117
CONCLUSION
As noted above, it has long been the rule that, as to a defendant
who takes flight during his trial, the trial may be continued to a
conclusion in absentia."8 Indeed, the reasonableness and necessity
of the procedure seem virtually beyond debate."' It is true that one
be prepared to accept less effective assistance of counsel than he would have received had he
remained present. "To be sure, a defendant's absence from trial may severely hamper even
the most diligent counsel's ability to represent his client effectively." Id. at 399, 380 N.E.2d
at 275, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 447. See also State v. Staples, 354 A.2d 771, 778 (Me. 1976); People
v. Vega, 80 Misc. 2d 59, 64, 363 N.Y.S.2d 214, 218 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974).
" See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
1,2 See United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421
U.S. 944 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977). But see United States v. Bentvena, 319
F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Mirra v. United States, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
"' See Cureton v. United States, 396 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1968); FED. R. CrmM. P. 43.
But cf. United States v. Boykin, 222 F. Supp. 398 (D. Md. 1963) (defendant permitted to
expressly waive presence because of age and illness).
" See, e.g., State v. Neff, 67 N.J. Super. 213, 170 A.2d 456 (1961); State ex rel. Boner
v. Boles, 148 W. Va. 802, 137 S.E.2d 418 (1964).
,,5 See, e.g., Byrd v. Hopper, 537 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048
(1977); State v. Camino, 118 Ariz. 89, 574 P.2d 1308, 1310 (1977); People v. Brown, 102 Cal.
App. 2d 60, 226 P.2d 609 (1951); People v. Smith, 6 Ill. 2d 414, 129 N.E.2d 164 (1955); People
v. Root, N.Y.L.J. Apr. 5, 1979, at 4, col. 1; People v. Montez, 65 App. Div. 2d 777, 410
N.Y.S.2d 8 (2d Dep't 1978).
,, See State v. Staples, 354 A.2d 771, 778 (Me. 1976).
, See United States v. Partlow, 428 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Cureton,
302 F. Supp. 1065 (D.D.C. 1968), affl'd, 413 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1969); State v. Taylor, 104
Ariz. 264, 451 P.2d 312 (1969). It has also been urged, unsuccessfully, that an absent defen-
dant is entitled to notice and a hearing on the question of the voluntariness of the departure
before trial could be resumed in absentia. State v. Staples, 354 A.2d 771, 775-76 (Me. 1976).
m See notes 18-26 and accompanying text supra.
", See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 348-49 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
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writer has taken the view that the practice of trying defendants in
absentia has an inherent tendency to foster disrespect for the law
because of its "totalitarian imagery. 120 Another has suggested that
even with advance warning, the practice is inherently unfair.' 2' To
this observer such criticism seems invalid, and when public trials
of defendants who have freely and knowingly chosen not to be pres-
ent122 are compared to totalitarian practices, it is suggested that the
fault lies with the analogy, not the system.
A more open question relates to the commencement of trial in
absentia after a defendant has fled prior to trial, but the applicable
principles invite the same conclusion. A defendant who is informed
that his trial will be held at a certain time and place and declines
an invitation to participate would seem to have little standing to
complain.'1 Nor do the standards of fundamental fairness appear
to be seriously offended. As previously noted, such respectable insti-
tutions as the American Law Institute, 124 the legislature and courts
of the State of Arizona, 121 the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,' 26 the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws,'
27
the United States courts of appeals for the second, third and fourth
circuits,' 21 the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington'2 9 and
even the United States Supreme Court' 0 have found the notion a
tolerable one.
The advantages to the orderly administration of justice are ob-
Brennan noted: "Thus there can be no doubt whatever that the governmental prerogative to
proceed with a trial may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial
from going forward." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). See also, Taylor v. United States, 417 U.S.
17, 20 (1973) (per curiam).
"I The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 30, 98 (1970).
12, See, e.g., In re Hunt, 276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967), vacated, 408 F.2d 1086 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 845 (1969).
'2 Indeed, they are violating the law by not being present. See United States v. Marotta,
518 F.2d 681, 698 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Vargas, 53 Cal. App. 3d 516, 523, 126 Cal. Rptr.
88, 96 (1975).
'23 Of course, a conviction after trial in absentia must be set aside in cases where it later
develops that the defendant was involuntarily absent. See Wade v. United States, 441 F.2d
1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971); State v. Taylor, 104 Ariz. 264, 451 P.2d 312 (1969). The phenomenon
seems to be a rare one, though, and not a significant drawback when the pros and cons are
weighed.
124 See note 30 supra.
'2 See notes 31 and 32 supra.
,26 See note 66 supra.
227 See note 67 supra.
' See notes 36-44 and 52-59 and accompanying text supra.
," See note 60 supra.
22 See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
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vious. As matters now stand in most jurisdictions, the defendant
who becomes a fugitive prior to trial can prevent his trial as long as
he can escape apprehension. In places like New York City this gen-
erally means delay until and unless he is arrested on another
charge.' Prolonged delay in the commencement of trial frequently
means that the case is never tried at all because evidence is lost by
accident or carelessness, witnesses die or drift out of reach,' 32 or the
defendant becomes the beneficiary of legal principles which would
otherwise be inapplicable.1 3
In most jurisdictions, too, a prosecution for the crime of bail
jumping is, all too frequently, a poor substitute for a determination
on the merits of the original charge. 34 If the latter is among the more
serious ones, the penalties for bail jumping are generally mild by
comparison.'3 5
All of these factors would seem to add up to a system of justice
that obtains for society a resolution of serious criminal charges on
the merits less frequently than it might, that encourages bail and
parole jumping by rewarding it, and possibly prejudices the rights
of defendants to reasonable bail because of that fact.'36 It is sug-
gested that a system which permits an accused, by his own miscon-
duct, to frustrate the orderly administration of justice in that fash-
ion hobbles itself unnecessarily.
This is not to say that no errors have been made relative to trial
in absentia or that there is no room for improvement. Commence-
ment of trial in absentia as to defendants who have not been warned
that this will occur is a particularly delicate area. To pronounce a
"I, See People v. Vega, 80 Misc. 2d 59, 64-65, 363 N.Y.S.2d 214, 219 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1974). In that case, the court further observed that there were then approximately
300,000 bench warrants outstanding in New York City "and the number issued each week
exceeds the number successfully executed." Id. at 64, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 219. National surveys
indicate a similar trend. See generally W. THoMAs, BAIL REFORM iN AMERICA 87-109 (1976);
P. WicE, FREEDOM FOR SALE 65-80 (1974).
"' See also People v. Vega, 80 Misc. 2d 59, 64-65, 363 N.Y.S.2d 214, 219 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1974).
I" It had been held, for example, that a fugitive, when finally apprehended, was entitled
to a dismissal of the charges because he had been denied a speedy trial. The authorities, it
was ruled, had not tried to find him with sufficient diligence. See People v. Canton, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 19, 1978, at 7, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santoro v. United States, 409 U.S.
1068 (1972); People v. Vega, 80 Misc. 2d 59, 64-65, 363 N.Y.S.2d 214, 219 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1974).
'1 See, e.g., United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1975).
"I See Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 455 (1899), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618
(1901); State v. Way, 76 Kan. 928, 931, 93 P. 159, 162 (1907).
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
rule that the right to be present cannot be waived without knowl-
edge of the probable consequences and then, without warning,
commence trial in absentia, seems difficult to defend. Truth in
packaging would appear to require either a revision of the law of
waiver as it affects the right to be present, or advance warning to
the defendant that the trial will proceed in his absence.
Of the two possibilities, a change in the law of waiver seems
unlikely. It is true that one writer has recently suggested that trial
in absentia involves a forfeiture rather than a waiver and that the
right to be present might be lost without an intent to waive it. 31
Nevertheless the Supreme Court seems wedded to the contrary
position-at least where commencement of trial in absentia is con-
cerned.1 3
Advance warning to the defendant that the trial will proceed
in his absence is eminently practical, as the State of Arizona has
demonstrated, with automatic notice to every defendant released on
bail or parole.' 39 In every jurisdiction that has permitted or contem-
plates permitting commencement of trial in absentia, adoption of
the Arizona procedure would seem an appropriate course, easily
accomplished. It is also suggested that in jurisdictions where the
"I See 10 UNIFORM RuLEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 713(b) Comment at 315 (1974).
The comment accompanying Rule 713 notes:
Although courts frequently describe voluntary-absence provisions as based
upon a waiver concept, the provisions are difficult to sustain in terms of traditional
waiver principles. For example, most do not require that the defendant have been
informed of the consequences of his failure to be present at trial. It seems likely
that the term "waiver" in this context has frequently been utilized to describe what
more accurately can be characterized as a procedural "forfeiture." The Supreme
Court has recognized that certain constitutional rights can be lost, notwithstanding
lack of intent to waive those rights, by simply failing to raise the constitutional
claim in accordance with a valid procedural Rules. Provisions relating to voluntary-
absence may often be viewed in the same light. Indeed, these provisions often are
framed in terms of a forfeiture concept-e.g., they state that "the further progress
of the trial shall not be prevented" by the voluntary absence.
Id..
13& See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (per curiam); Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-37 (1973). Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), a case cited
in the comment to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, see note 37 supra, involves an unsuccesful
collateral attack on a conviction, based upon the belated claim that Blacks had been excluded
from the indicting grand jury. 411 U.S. at 235. Aside from the different nature of the right,
the decision relies heavily upon the failure of the defense to object in a timely way-a
phenomenon virtually unheard of when a trial proceeds in absentia. In the latter case, counsel
almost always objects, and strenously. See, e.g., People v. Snyder, 56 Cal. App. 3d 195, 199,
128 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (1976); People v. Vargas, 53 Cal. App. 3d 516, 520, 126 Cal. Rptr. 88,
92 (1975); State v. Staples, 354 A.2d 771, 774 (Me. 1976).
"I See note 31 supra.
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question is an open one, trial judges who consider the commence-
ment of trial in absentia a viable alternative should explicitly advise
the defendant the failure to appear on the date set for trial will be
treated as a waiver and result in the commencement of trial in
absentia."'
140 See State v. Camino, 118 Ariz. App. 89, 90, 574 P.2d 1308, 1309 (1977).
